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production – on the relationship between trade and business cycle synchronization across 
countries. We develop an international business cycle model in which the degree of vertical 
specialization varies with trade barriers. With perfect competition, we show analytically that 
fluctuations in measured total factor productivity are not linked across countries through 
trade. In numerical simulations, we find little dependence of business cycle synchronization 
on trade intensity. An extension of the model to allow for imperfect competition has the 
potential to resolve these shortcomings.  
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In recent empirical work, several authors have documented a link between international trade
and cross-country business cycle synchronization. Frankel & Rose (1998) established that
country pairs that trade more exhibit on average higher correlations in their business cycles,
as measured by ￿ uctuations in GDP.1 However, Kose & Yi (2001) and (2006) have illustrated
what they call a trade-comovement puzzle: standard international real business cycle models
along the lines of Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1994) cannot quantitatively account for the
relationship between trade and business cycle comovement.
In this paper, we develop an international business cycle model augmented with vertical
specialization - i.e., the production of goods in multiple stages spread across countries - and
quantitatively assess its ability to generate stronger business cycle synchronization between
countries that trade more. In addressing the empirical facts behind the trade-comovement
puzzle, several authors have suggested that it is not only the volume of trade, but partic-
ular features of specialization patterns and industrial structure associated with increased
trade that lead to business cycle synchronization. Frankel & Rose (1998) conjectured that
intra-industry trade tends to make countries more correlated, while Kose & Yi (2001) have
suggested that vertical specialization may be the key linkage that synchronizes business
cycles of countries with close trade relationships. The intuition is that if closer trade rela-
tionships are characterized by tighter links in the chain of production, ￿ uctuations in one
economy should be transmitted more to the other.2
1Recent papers that have con￿rmed this ￿nding are Clark & Van Wincoop (2001) and Baxter & Koupar-
itsas (2005).
2Indeed, Ng (2007) ￿nds that direct measures of bilateral vertical specialization are related to increased
business cycle correlation, and that intra-industry trade plays no signi￿cant role once vertical specialization
is taken into account. In addition, Di Giovanni & Levchenko (2008), using cross-country industry-level data,
2The main innovation of our work is to introduce producer heterogeneity with two stages of
production into an international business cycle model along the lines of Backus et al. (1994).
In this respect, our model is similar to Yi (2003) and (2009), extended to an environment
with aggregate uncertainty. In each stage, the degree of specialization by each country is
endogenously determined. As a result, each country requires inputs from the other to produce
￿nal output. Since this link is stronger when countries trade a wider range of goods, this
vertical specialization provides a potential mechanism for the model to generate increased
business cycle correlation with higher trade.
We ￿rst consider a model with perfect competition, as in the Ricardian model of Eaton
& Kortum (2002). Qualitatively, this model generates an increase in GDP correlation with
higher trade intensity, but falls short quantitatively compared to the data. There are two
￿ndings that explain this result: one analytical, and one numerical. The analytical ￿nding
is that, when standard national income accounting methods are used to construct real GDP,
￿ uctuations in measured Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in each country depend only
on domestic shocks, to a ￿rst-order approximation. Hence, trade links do not transmit
technology shocks across countries directly into measured productivity. Changes in real
GDP, though, are accounted for by changes in TFP as well as changes in factor inputs; the
numerical ￿nding is that the correlation across countries of changes in inputs is not su¢ cient
to generate substantial correlation in real GDP, nor a signi￿cant dependence of business
cycle correlation on trade intensity.
These results allow us to identify the features of the model that lead standard accounting
methods to understate the impact of trade on international business cycle transmission. Most
￿nd that the correlation of output in industries with vertical production linkages is more sensitive to trade.
3notable of these features is the fact that perfect competition prevents e¢ ciency di⁄erences
across producers from translating into di⁄erences in measured productivity. To address
this issue, we introduce imperfect competition following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen & Kortum
(2003), allowing for markups to vary across producers with di⁄erent e¢ ciency. In this model,
e¢ ciency di⁄erences do translate into measured productivity di⁄erences, and we ￿nd that
this new channel gives the model the potential to generate cross-country correlations in
measured TFP, and thus real GDP, that increase with trade intensity.
This paper is most closely related to recent papers that attempt to account for the trade-
comovement relationship. Burstein, Kurz & Tesar (2008) show that allowing for production
sharing among countries can deliver tighter business cycle synchronization.3 Our results
suggest that for looking at real GDP, relaxing key assumptions such as constant elasticity
of substitution in preferences and perfect competition could be crucial for changing the
implications of trade intensity for business cycle behavior. Drozd & Nosal (2008) deviate from
the standard neoclassical framework and address the link between trade and comovement in
a model featuring a low short-run price elasticity of trade coexisting with a high long-run
price elasticity.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II. lays out our model and section III.
discusses the structure of vertical specialization. Section IV. discusses the dynamics of real
GDP and measured productivity. Section V. reviews some data on vertical specialization and
links various measures to our model. Section VI. describes our numerical experiments with
3Following a di⁄erent approach, Huang & Liu (2007) argue that multiple stages of production increase
business cycle comovement in the presence of nominal rigidities.
4In related work, Bergin, Feenstra & Hanson (2007) combine a model of outsourcing of production with
non-CES preferences to account for the variance of output in outsourcing industries in Mexico compared to
the US.
4perfect competition, and Section VII. discusses the extension with imperfect competition
and variable markups. Section VIII. concludes.
II. Setup of the Model
Goods are produced in two stages with the second stage of production (production of ￿￿nal
goods￿ ) using goods produced in the ￿rst stage (￿intermediate goods￿ ). The presence of
Ricardian comparative advantage, which we model as in Eaton & Kortum (2002), leads
countries to endogenously specialize across a continuum of goods in each stage.
The time horizon is in￿nite and discrete, and periods are indexed by t = 0;1;:::. In each
country, there are two sectors of production: a tradeable sector and a nontradeable sector.
There is a continuum of measure one of goods in both stages of tradeable production. To
economize on notation, except where noted below, we index both intermediate and ￿nal
goods in the tradeable sector by !, although an intermediate good labelled ! and a ￿nal
good labelled ! are distinct commodities. We use subscripts to refer to stages of production,
s = 1;2, and time periods, and we use superscripts to refer to countries, i;j = 1;2. When a
variable has a double superscript, the ￿rst index refers to the source country and the second
refers to the destination.
Production of Tradeable Goods
Each ￿rst-stage intermediate input ! can be produced in country i using a constant returns




1t is a country-speci￿c time-varying productivity shock common to all intermediate goods
producers in country i, and zi
1 (!) is a good-speci￿c e¢ ciency that is constant over time.
5Output of each intermediate good ! produced by country i is given by:
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1t (!) and ‘i
1t (!) denote capital and labor, respectively, used in the production of
good !, and ￿ 2 (0;1).




















1t￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ . (3)
Here, wi
t denotes the wage and ri
t is the rental rate of capital in country i.
Purchasers of intermediate goods in each country buy each good from the source country
that o⁄ers the lowest price after accounting for trade costs. We adopt the standard ￿iceberg￿
cost formulation, so that delivering one unit of any stage-s good from country i to country j
requires shipping ￿ij
s units, with ￿ii
s = 1 and ￿ij
s ￿ 1. Therefore, the price at which country
j purchases intermediate good ! is given by:
p
j






1 : i = 1;2
￿
. (4)
6The technology for producing output of ￿nal good ! is:5
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2t (!), and ‘i
2t (!) denote capital and labor used in the production of ￿nal good !,
Ai
2t and zi
2 (!) are time-varying and good-speci￿c e¢ ciency for ￿nal goods, respectively, and
mi
t (!;!0) is the use of intermediate good !0 in the production of ￿nal good !. The parameter
￿ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent intermediate inputs. We de￿ne the















where the subscript T distinguishes variables for the tradeable sector from corresponding
variables for the nontradeable sector, discussed below.






























5Unless otherwise noted, integration is over the entire set of goods in the relevant stage of production.
7Here, the term P i











Similar to ￿rst-stage goods, ￿nal goods are also purchased in each country from the source










2 : i = 1;2
￿
.
Final goods are purchased by households to form composite consumption and investment





































In the next section, we impose further structure on the distribution of good-speci￿c
e¢ ciencies, and derive how these assumptions shape the pattern of trade and the prices paid
for goods in each country.
8Technology structure for tradeable goods
We follow the probabilistic representation of Eaton & Kortum (2002) for good-speci￿c e¢ -
ciencies. For each country i, stage s, and good !, zi
s (!) is drawn from a FrØchet distribution
with cumulative distribution function:
F
i





s > 0 and ￿ > 1. E¢ ciency draws are independent across goods, stages, and
countries. The probability that a particular stage-s good ! can be produced in country i
with e¢ ciency less than or equal to z is given by F i
s (z). Since draws are independent across
the continuum of goods, F i
s (z) also denotes the fraction of stage-s goods that country i is
able to produce with e¢ ciency at most z.
As in Eaton & Kortum (2002), the cross country di⁄erences in T i
s re￿ ect absolute advan-
tage in the production of goods in each stage: a country with a higher T i
s draws e¢ ciencies
for all goods in a given stage from a better distribution. The parameter ￿ determines the
dispersion of e¢ ciency draws, and hence governs heterogeneity across goods and leads to
comparative advantage within each stage of production. In addition, since the terms T i
s may
di⁄er for s = 1;2, our technological structure allows for comparative advantage across stages,
determined by the ratio T i
1=T i
2 across countries. A country with a higher T i
1=T i
2, for example,
is relatively more productive in intermediate inputs.
As Eaton & Kortum (2002) show, the distribution of prices of stage-1 goods that country
i o⁄ers to country j is equal to G
ij











s . The probability
that country j is able to purchase a certain good at price below p is the probability that either









Therefore, the overall distribution of prices of stage-s goods available in country j is
G
j

























Since the only dimension of heterogeneity across goods in a given stage is e¢ ciency, we
can aggregate across goods by aggregating across e¢ ciency levels or across prices. With this






















where ￿ is the Gamma function, ￿(a) =
R 1
0 ta￿1e￿tdt.
The probability that country j buys a certain good from country i, or alternatively


























In addition, because the distribution of stage-s goods actually purchased by country j from
country i is equal to the overall price distribution G
j
st, the fraction ￿
ij
st of goods purchased
10from country i is also equal to the fraction of country j￿ s total expenditures on stage-s goods
that it spends on goods from country i.
Production of nontradeable goods
























Nt(!) is the quantity of intermediate good ! purchased for use in the production of




































Each country is populated by an in￿nitely-lived representative household which values se-
quences of consumption of tradeable ￿nal goods, consumption of nontradeable goods, and



















(1 ￿ ") ,
11where L denotes the fraction of time devoted to labor supplied in domestic production, CT
denotes the tradeable composite consumption de￿ned in (11) and CN denotes consumption of
nontradeable goods. E denotes the expectation over the entire time horizon, and ￿ 2 (0;1)
is the household￿ s discount factor. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) determines the fraction of
aggregate expenditure on tradeable goods and " > 0 determines the household￿ s elasticity of
substitution across dates and states of the world.
The household also purchases tradeable and nontradeable investment goods, Xi
Tt and
Xi













￿1￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)K
i
t , (21)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate of capital and the fraction ￿ of investment expenditures are
spent on tradeable goods. We assume that the household spends a constant share of income
on nontradeable consumption and nontradeable investment to avoid needing excessively high
transportation costs to generate realistic levels of trade.
The household receives income from selling labor services and renting capital to ￿rms.
We assume that countries do not trade ￿nancial assets - that is, trade in goods is balanced






























6The ￿ndings in Heathcote & Perri (2002) suggest that models with ￿nancial autarky generate inter-
national comovement that is closer to the data than models with complete ￿nancial markets. Models with
complete markets have a strong risk-sharing channel from which we wish to abstract to isolate the mecha-
nisms in our model.
12Market Clearing and Equilibrium
Let ￿i
st denote the set of stage-s goods which country i produces. We de￿ne total capital







































We use the expenditure shares de￿ned in (17) to write aggregated market clearing con-
ditions for goods in each stage and sector. Country i￿ s expenditure on goods from country j
equal a fraction ￿
ji
st for stage-s goods. Since producers are perfectly competitive, the income
paid to factors in the ￿rst stage equals the value of ￿rst-stage production in country i, and
the income paid to factors in production of ￿nal goods equals a fraction ￿ of the value of
























































































, i = 1;2 . (26)
An equilibrium consists of stochastic processes for prices and quantities such that house-
holds￿utility is maximized subject to (21) and (22), producers￿costs are minimized, and the
market clearing conditions for goods and factor inputs are satis￿ed each period. We solve
for an equilibrium in terms of consumption, investment, and intermediate input expendi-
tures, capital and labor supplies, factor prices, and composite price indices, with quantities
aggregated across the continuum of goods in the case of the two tradeable stages. We use a
standard linear approximation method to solve for recursive decision rules in the neighbor-
hood of the model￿ s deterministic steady state.7
III. Vertical Specialization Structure
We now brie￿ y compare the vertical specialization structure in our model to related ways of
specifying this feature. We will focus our comparison on three recent contributions, Eaton
& Kortum (2002), Burstein et al. (2008), and Yi (2009).
Eaton & Kortum (2002) assume that each good is used as both an intermediate and a
￿nal good.8 Intermediate inputs are combined to produce output in the same way as in
our second stage technology, summarized in (5). Their modeling of intermediate inputs is
simple in that it does not incorporate any notion of specialization into di⁄erent stages of
7Similar approaches are used by Ghironi & Melitz (2005) and Naknoi (2008), in models with a continuum
of goods.
8A similar intermediate inputs structure has been explored by Krugman & Venables (1995).
14production. Specialization in di⁄erent stages does exist in Burstein et al. (2008) who employ
an Armington-aggregator structure in which intermediate inputs from di⁄erent countries are
combined with a ￿xed elasticity of substitution into a ￿nal good. However, the pattern of
specialization is ￿xed in that countries do not specialize in the production of the goods in
which they are most e¢ cient.
An alternative model with endogenous specialization is the one used in Yi (2003) and
(2009), in which there are two stages, but each second-stage good uses exactly one ￿rst-stage
good as an input, not a bundle of all the goods. Our intermediate input structure can be
considered as a combination of Eaton & Kortum (2002) and the two-stage structure of Yi
(2009), and our assumption that all ￿nal producers use the same bundle of inputs allows us
to solve the model using the results in Eaton & Kortum (2002). Our model incorporates in
a parsimonious way two of the important features of Yi￿ s setup - endogenous specialization
and trade in intermediate inputs - that could create additional linkages in the production
processes of countries through increased trade.
There are two di⁄erences between our setup and that in Yi (2009). First, in our model, the
degree of vertical specialization depends on trade barriers, but is the same for all goods. In
Yi (2009), only a fraction of goods are produced with vertical specialization, and this fraction
depends on trade intensity. Second, in Yi (2009), for the goods that are vertically specialized,
a decrease in the price of imports would make both the input and output price in the second
stage drop by a proportional amount. This mechanism generates large changes in trade
shares for goods that are vertically specialized, or goods that become vertically specialized
as a result. In our model, since each good uses the same composite of intermediate inputs, a
drop in import prices causes the input price index and the output price of any ￿nal good to
15drop by only a fraction of the import price drop, and the elasticity of trade shares to import
prices is the same for all goods.
IV. Real GDP and Productivity in the Model
Compared to standard international business cycle models, our model contains additional
potential channels of international transmission of ￿ uctuations through trade. The presence
of vertical specialization links countries￿production processes, and the degree of special-
ization increases with trade intensity, so that countries that trade more have production
processes that are more closely linked.
In standard international business cycle models in which all value-added is created in a
single stage of production, technology shocks are transmitted across countries through the
imperfect substitutability of goods: a country that receives a favorable shock demands more
imports as well as domestic goods for consumption and investment, so its trading partner
produces more. In our model, there is an additional e⁄ect from having two stages of produc-
tion: a country with a favorable shock o⁄ers its trading partner lower prices for intermediate
inputs, which makes production of ￿nal goods more e¢ cient, as the same amount of out-
put can be produced with lower input expenditures. If the degree of vertical specialization
increases with trade intensity, then there is more potential for a country to bene￿t from for-
eign technology improvements in this way. Additionally, due to endogenous specialization,
countries produce the goods in which they are most e¢ cient, so that foreign productivity
improvements cause increased specialization into more e¢ ciently produced goods at home.
To assess the potential impact of these mechanisms on business cycle comovement, we
need to construct a measure of real value added, or GDP. In order to compare the model￿ s
16predictions to data, we construct a measure of real GDP from the model￿ s output comparable
with standard national accounting methods. In our model, since there is a continuum of
goods and changing trade patterns, we have some choice regarding how to compute aggregate
quantities. Since our results depend heavily on the method of GDP measurement, we dwell
on this point a bit here: in the ￿rst subsection below, we explain the de￿nitions of aggregate
statistics we use, and in the second subsection, we derive some of the implications of our
choices for ￿ uctuations in aggregate productivity.
National Accounts Statistics in the Model
We construct an analogue of real GDP, that is, GDP measured in base period prices, as
reported in actual data by national statistical agencies. In order to do this in a way that is
as close as possible to the methods used by these agencies, we follow the recommendations
in the UN￿ s System of National Accounts 1993 (SNA93).
We de￿ne nominal GDP at current prices as aggregate value-added, or the di⁄erence
between the total value of gross output less total expenditures on intermediate inputs. Gross
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To construct real GDP as measured in the data, we reconstruct the above formulas using

















































Nt (!)d! . (30)
where pi




E⁄ectively, we are using what national statistical agencies refer to as a ￿double-de￿ ation￿
method, de￿ ating the current price values of gross output and intermediate consumption
each by their own de￿ ators.
A practical problem that this method raises is that country-speci￿c period-0 producer
prices, ~ qi
s0 (!), are not de￿ned for all goods, due to the fact that specialization patterns
change in the model. For example, it may be the case that good ! is produced in country 1
in period t, but was not produced by country 1 in period 0; country 1 would have imported
the good in period 0. In this case, it is not obvious at what price we should value country
1￿ s output of good ! in period t when calculating real gross output. On the one hand, the
SNA 93 recommends (paragraph 16.53) using average price changes of similar products as a
proxy for the change in price of a new good between the base period and the current period;
18adapting this interpretation in our model would mean using country 1￿ s price of selling the
good to itself in period 0, q1
s0 (!). On the other hand, if we use the price at which the good
was imported in period 0, then the product account (gross output less intermediate inputs)
is consistent with the expenditure account (consumption plus investment less net exports),
because the base period consumer price is unambiguously equal to the import price. We
proceed with the latter assumption, but this choice has essentially no e⁄ect on our results.
Measured TFP correlation
In Section VI., we perform several numerical experiments to evaluate the extent to which
increased trade intensity a⁄ects business cycle synchronization in the presence of vertical
specialization. In this section, however, we show that, in one important respect, trade in
our model does not make countries more correlated: changes in measured TFP, constructed
in our model using real GDP as de￿ned above, are not linked across countries through
international trade. That is, although measured TFP is an endogenous object in our model,
there is no endogenous link between TFP across countries, and hence no dependence on
trade intensity of the correlation in TFP. When measuring aggregate accounting statistics as
in the data, the dynamics of TFP are pinned down by exogenous factors alone. In addition,
the intuition behind the result suggests that it holds for a wide class of dynamic models with
endogenous specialization and trade in intermediate goods. Without comovement in TFP,
our model can produce endogenous comovement in GDP, but to a small degree, as we show
in the next section.9
9This is consistent with the ￿nding in Kose & Yi (2006), that the standard model can account for
the trade-comovement puzzle if it is exogenously imposed that the correlation of TFP increases with trade
intensity.
19Our result can be stated as follows:












follows, to a ￿rst order approximation:
^ A
i
t = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
i
1t + ￿ ^ A
i
2t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
i
Nt . (32)
A sketch of the proof of this and the next proposition is provided in the appendix. The
proposition is related to Hulten (1978), who showed that, in a multi-sector neoclassical
closed economy with intermediate inputs, aggregate TFP evolves as a weighted average of
sectoral productivity growth, with the weights given by sectoral gross output shares of GDP.
Equation (32) shows that aggregate TFP in our model behaves exactly as in a three-sector
version of the closed economy models that Hulten considers, with only one of the sectors
supplying intermediate inputs.
The intuition for this stark result is straightforward, given the assumptions used in aggre-
gating value-added across goods to construct real GDP. First, because we use good-speci￿c
prices in valuing the output of each producer, e¢ ciency di⁄erences across goods do not show
up in the value of output: in the presence of perfect competition, a producer with higher e¢ -
ciency simply charges a proportionally lower price, so the measured value of output per unit
of input does not vary across producers.10 Bernard et al. (2003) and Gibson (2006) raise the
10This is only true for goods that are produced in the same country in a period t and the base period.
However, to a ￿rst-order approximation, the goods that switch country of production contribute zero to
20same point regarding the e⁄ect of reallocation that occurs in response to trade liberalization
in models with heterogeneous producers and monopolistic competition. Second, by using
base period prices, the ￿ uctuations in the value of income from movements in factor costs
and prices do not show up in the computation of real GDP, a point made by Kehoe & Ruhl
(2008). Even with intermediate goods, the gains in e¢ ciency that result from purchasing
imported inputs at cheaper prices are removed by valuing inputs at base period prices.11
To show that the accounting method is the reason that foreign productivity shocks do
not a⁄ect domestic TFP, in the next proposition we show that a welfare-based measure of
productivity does capture the e⁄ects of foreign productivity shocks through trade.


















































A welfare-based measure of productivity increases when the share of goods that a country
buys from itself, ￿
ii
st, decreases in either stage. Foreign productivity improvements generate
changes in real GDP. Interestingly, the distributions of e¢ ciencies in each stage do not play any role in
deriving this result. As long as we look at ￿rst-order e⁄ects, where the goods that switch contribute zero to
changes in real GDP, the proof goes through under any speci￿cation of the e¢ ciency distributions.
11Equation (32) shows that, if production technologies are not Cobb-Douglas, TFP correlations could
rise with trade intensity if an increase in trade shifts countries￿output shares toward sectors that are more
correlated.
21such a decrease in the share of goods purchased domestically. In this sense, the welfare-based
productivity measure re￿ ects transmission of productivity shocks across countries.
V. Vertical Specialization and Trade
Before proceeding to our numerical experiments, we review some measures of vertical spe-
cialization in the data, and show how to construct corresponding measures in the model.
A commonly cited measure of vertical specialization is the one in Hummels, Ishii & Yi
(2001). The authors de￿ne an index of vertical specialization for a given sector as the ra-
tio of imported inputs to gross output. To construct an economywide measure of vertical
specialization, they aggregate this index across sectors, weighted by each sector￿ s share of
exports, to capture the degree to which imported inputs are important in exporting sectors.
















where ￿ denotes a sector, IIi
￿ denotes imported intermediates in sector ￿, and Zi
￿ denotes
gross output in sector ￿. When the exports of a sector are zero, that sector does not a⁄ect
the index. When imported intermediate inputs in a sector are zero, that sector does not add
to the numerator of the index. Countries are more vertically specialized if they export more
in sectors that use imported intermediates intensively. Using Input-Output tables Hummels
et al. (2001) report increasing vertical specialization in international trade evaluated using
this index; some numbers taken from their paper are illustrated in the columns labelled ￿VS
index￿in Table 1.
22TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
In our model we do not explicitly map the continuum of goods into a sectoral categoriza-
tion. For the purposes of constructing a measure of vertical specialization comparable to the
above index, we can think of all the goods as being assigned to one sector in the data.12 The
share of intermediates in gross output for all the second stage goods is ￿ while the share of
the value of imported intermediates out of the total value of intermediates is ￿
ij
1t. Therefore,

















s , s = 1;2 denote gross output in each stage and Ei
s denotes country i￿ s exports
from in each stage.
Additionally, we can use input-output tables to directly construct measures in the data
analogous to the shares of intermediate and ￿nal expenditures spend by a country on do-




2. Table 1 also shows these statistics. As trade has increased
signi￿cantly over time in these countries (a decrease in the fraction spent on domestic goods),
both the shares of imported intermediate and ￿nal goods have increased. However, the im-
ported share of intermediate inputs increased more than the imported share of ￿nal goods.
In the next section, we evaluate the ability of versions of our model with and without
vertical specialization to generate higher synchronization of business cycles between countries
that have higher trade intensity.
12Alternatively, a random assignment of subsets of goods along the continuum from each stage into sectors
would give the same result.
23VI. Numerical Experiments
We set several parameters to standard values in the international business cycle literature.
We interpret one model period as one quarter, and set the discount factor ￿ = 0:99 so that
the steady state real interest rate is 4% per year. We set ￿ to 0:3, so 30% of value added is
paid to capital. The depreciation rate ￿ is set to 2:5% per period. The utility parameter ￿ is
set to 0:34, so that about 1=3 of the total time endowment is supplied as labor in the steady
state. We set the share of tradeable output in GDP to match the share of nontradeable
expenditures in the model to the share of ￿nal expenditures on services in US input-output
tables, giving ￿ = :3.









t+1, for i = 1;2, where "i
t is a mean-zero normally distributed i.i.d.
innovation with standard deviation ￿". We set ￿ = 0:9 and ￿" = 0:01. Both values are close
to those used, for example, by Backus et al. (1994), and generate average autocorrelation
and standard deviation of HP-￿ltered TFP in our benchmark experiments of 0:59 and 0:017,
respectively. Notably, we do not build any correlation into the shocks to technology across
countries or across sectors, so that we isolate the degree to which our model endogenously
generates cross-country correlation in measured real GDP.13
The model contains two parameters related to the elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic and foreign goods. As in Eaton & Kortum (2002), the role of the parameter ￿ in
determining the elasticity of trade is concealed by the role of ￿. While ￿ governs substi-
13Adding positive correlation in the exogenous shocks would increase the levels of cross-country correla-
tions, but does not a⁄ect their dependence on trade intensity.
24tutability in the intensive margin - within goods that are continuously traded - ￿ governs the
heterogeneity across goods, and hence determines the extent to which the extensive margin
of trade in new goods responds to variations in technology or trade costs. At the aggregate
level, the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods in our model is
￿. As Ruhl (2008) notes, measures of this aggregate elasticity in the data di⁄er depending
on the source of price variation: measures from time series data give small elasticities of
the magnitude typically used in international business cycle models. On the other hand,
estimates from cross-section data relating trade patterns to tari⁄and non-tari⁄barriers ￿nd
elasticities that are much higher. Since the parameter ￿ governs the elasticity in response to
both types of price variation in our model, we balance between the two measures by choos-
ing a value of ￿ = 3:6 because it is the lowest of the three estimates from Eaton & Kortum
(2002). For the elasticity of substitution ￿ that determines the substitution between di⁄erent
goods, we use the benchmark value of Backus et al. (1994) of ￿ = 1:5, which is consistent
with estimates of the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods by SITC
commodity groups.14
The parameter ￿ determines the share of gross output in ￿nal goods paid to intermediate
inputs. We consider two versions of our model, a one-stage benchmark with ￿ = 1, and
a version with vertical specialization, with ￿ = 0:5, which is approximately the ratio of
intermediate inputs to gross output in US input-output tables.
In the experiments below, we choose the technology parameters T i
s and the trade costs ￿ij
s
to generate di⁄erent steady state specialization and international trade patterns. We subse-
14Recent estimates by Broda & Weinstein (2006) place the median value of this elastictity across all
sectors to be 2.5 and the average value much higher than that. The model constrains us to set ￿ > ￿ ￿ 1
but raising the elasticity does not substantially alter our results.
25quently look at the degree of business cycle comovement across these di⁄erent patterns.15
Results
We look at various cross-country correlations of H-P ￿ltered variables in di⁄erent versions of
the model. In addition to real GDP and TFP, we also look at the correlations between coun-
tries of welfare-based real income, ~ Y i; aggregate labor supply; real consumption expenditures
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In light of Proposition 2, we show the alternative income measure, ~ Y , to get a sense of
how large the e⁄ects of increases in trade and vertical specialization are on comovement,
even though it does not appear in traditional national accounting statistics.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.
We ￿rst look at a version of the model with no vertical specialization which we denote as
the benchmark. The goal is to subsequently introduce di⁄erent experiments where vertical
specialization arises for di⁄erent reasons and compare the properties of these versions of
the model with the benchmark. The left half of Table 2 shows statistics for the benchmark
15In an appendix available online, we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the elasticity parameters
￿ and ￿, and the correlation of shocks "i
t+1, and show that the nature of our main results do not change.
26model, with ￿ = 1, and with symmetric countries, so that T 1
s = T 2
s . When we vary trade
costs to generate steady state trade to GDP ratios between 3% and 15%, we see that the
correlation of real GDP across countries increases very slightly, from .01 to .04. One way
to compare this numbers to measures in the data is by looking at the implied slope of the
GDP correlation - trade intensity relationship: the di⁄erence in GDP correlation over the
di⁄erence in the log of the trade to GDP ratio. Kose & Yi (2006) estimate this slope at
0.091 in cross-country data. The slope for our benchmark model is 0.019, about one ￿fth
of Kose and Yi￿ s estimate. Our experiments are conducted for trade intensities exceeding
those of the typical country pair in Kose and Yi￿ s data, so this slope should be considered an
upper bound on what our model can produce. Kose and Yi also show that a three-country
extension of Backus et al. (1994) calibrated to match bilateral trade shares for select countries
can account for at most about 11% of this slope (in their baseline calibration). Con￿rming
Proposition 1, the correlation of TFP across countries is close to zero, and essentially does
not rise with trade intensity. The correlations of labor, investment, and consumption rise
across trade intensities, from .02 to .10 for labor and investment, and from .01 to .11 for
consumption. In addition, consistent with Proposition 2, the correlations of the alternative
measure of real income ~ Y , and the corresponding productivity measure ~ A, increase with
trade intensity much more than that of real GDP. The implied slope of these correlations
with trade intensity is 0.056, nearly triple the real GDP slope.
The right half of Table 2 shows our model with vertical specialization, in three cases in
which the trade costs ￿ij
s and technology parameters T i
s are the same across countries and
across stages of production. As trade intensity increases in this model from 3% to 15%, the
27steady state vertical specialization measure increases as well, from 0.26% to 1.32%.16 The
patterns of cross country correlations are broadly similar to the one-stage model, except
that the increases are smaller as trade intensity rises. Even for the correlations of ~ Y and
~ A, real income and its associated productivity measure, the increases across trade intensity
are smaller than in the one stage benchmark. This result makes sense, given proposition
2, and the fact that technology shocks might change specialization to a di⁄erent degree in




2t, there is another source of
variation in ~ A compared to the one-stage benchmark. In fact, with symmetric countries, the
presence of two stages of production actually reduces, rather than enhances the dependence
of comovement on trade.
Another reason that correlations rise with trade intensity to a smaller degree in the
model with vertical specialization is that our measure of trade intensity is a measure of the
gross output of goods traded, not value added. As Kose & Yi (2001) point out, for a given
trade intensity, less value-added is traded in the model with vertical specialization than in
the model without. If we instead vary transport costs so that the value-added of imports
relative to GDP is 3%, 9%, and 15%, then the correlations of real GDP are .01, .02, and .03,
respectively.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.
In Table 3 we show statistics for two variations of our model with 15% trade intensity,
in which trade costs di⁄er across stages of production. The column labelled ￿Low VS￿
16While the ￿
ij
1 fractions in our model results come close to the data for, for example, the US (compare
to 1￿￿
ii
1 in Table 1), the V S measures our model predicts are much smaller than in the data. This suggests
that sectoral di⁄erences that are emphasized by the V S measure of Hummels et al. (2001) may be important.
28has relatively high trade costs for ￿rst stage goods, so that trade intensity in these goods
is dampened, while the column labelled ￿High VS￿has relatively low trade costs for ￿rst
stage goods. The results indicate that a higher degree of vertical specialization does not
signi￿cantly a⁄ect the business cycle correlations we consider if countries are symmetric.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.
Finally, in Table 4 we consider a case in which countries are asymmetric: we choose the
T i
s terms so that country 1 has a comparative advantage in the production of stage 1 goods,
while country 2 has a comparative advantage in stage 2 goods, and both countries have
the same steady state GDP. In the left column, labeled ￿low specialization￿ , the degree of
comparative advantage is smaller than in the right column, labeled ￿high specialization￿ , so
that the vertical specialization measure for country 2 is larger, and for country 1 is smaller,
in the right column. We see again that most of the cross-country correlations change little
across these cases. The exception is the correlation of real value added across countries
in di⁄erent stages: while the correlation of real value added in the sector in which each
country specializes is only .02 in the low specialization case, this correlation increases to .13
in the high specialization case. The extent to which countries are negatively correlated in
the sectors in which they do not have comparative advantage increases as well. The negative
change slightly outweighs the positive change here, so that even though it applies to sectors
that are small in each country, the overall e⁄ect is that the correlation of aggregate real GDP
is similar under low specialization or high specialization.
In these results, we have shown that several versions of our model can generate moderate
increases in business cycle comovement with increases in trade intensity. However, for the
29cases we have considered here, these increases are small, and the addition of vertical special-
ization does not contribute signi￿cantly to magnifying them. While asymmetric countries in
our model clearly do display the tight links across sectors that vertical specialization implies,
additional mechanisms would be needed to translate these links to aggregate real GDP and
measured TFP. In the next section, we examine one such mechanism.
VII. An Extension with Imperfect Competition
Having established that our model with perfect competition does not provide a link between
trade and TFP correlations, we follow Bernard et al. (2003) by introducing in our model a
sort of imperfect competition that breaks the link between prices and producers￿e¢ ciencies,
and show that it has the potential to link trade intensity to correlations in measured TFP,
as well as real GDP.
We modify the structure of our model as follows: in each country, there are a large
number of potential producers of each good, and country i￿ s k￿ th most e¢ cient producer of
good ! in stage s has e¢ ciency zi
ks (!). The lowest cost among producers in both countries
of delivering good ! to country j is then p
j
1st (!) = minfqi
st￿ij
s =zi
1s (!) : i = 1;2g.
Under Bertrand competition, each good is sold in a country by the producer with the
lowest-cost of selling there, but this producer charges a price equal to either the second
best producer￿ s marginal cost or a ￿xed markup over its own marginal cost, whichever is
smaller. The second lowest cost is p
j
2st (!) = min2 fqi
st￿ij
s =zi
ks (!) : i = 1;2;k = 1;2g, where
min2 refers to the second smallest. Therefore, the price charged for good ! in country j is
p
j









30where ￿ m = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) is the monopolistic markup. In this model, we assume that ￿ > 1, so
that the monopolistic markup is positive.
The only relevant e¢ ciencies for determining prices and production patterns are zi
1s (!)
and zi
2s (!). We assume that these e¢ ciencies are jointly distributed according to the ana-
logue of the FrØchet distribution in Bernard et al. (2003): the joint probability that zi
1s (!) ￿
z1 and zi
2s (!) ￿ z2, for z2 ￿ z1, is given by F i
s (z1;z2) =
￿












The marginal distribution of z1 is still given by (13), so the parameters T i
s and ￿ play the
same role as in the previous setup. Following the derivations in Bernard et al. (2003), the
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st and the trade shares ￿
ij
st are de￿ned in the same way as in (15) and (17).
Finally, the model with Bertrand competition di⁄ers in that producers earn pro￿ts, so
consumers￿budget constraints are modi￿ed to include pro￿ts and the market clearing con-
ditions are modi￿ed. As Bernard et al. (2003) show, aggregate pro￿ts in each stage are a
fraction 1=(1 + ￿) of total revenues, so that the market clearing conditions for each stage of











































































In the case of Bertrand competition, e¢ ciency does not map one-to-one to prices, as
31evident in (38). In light of the discussion in Section IV., this disconnection gives the model
more potential to generate cross-country correlation in measured TFP and real GDP.17 Table
5 displays the analogues of the results in Table 2 for this extension of the model. As we
go from 3% to 15% trade intensity, the correlation of real GDP increases from .01 to .06
in the one stage benchmark, and from .04 to .09 in the vertical specialization model. The
slope of the GDP correlation in the vertical specialization model is 0.031, about one third
of the slope estimated in the data in Kose & Yi (2006). This increase is also seen in the
correlation of measured TFP, which increases from .02 to to .06 in the one stage model, and
from .04 to .10 in the vertical model. The latter result was qualitatively missing in the model
with perfect competition. In the vertical specialization model with imperfect competition,
the implied slope of the TFP correlation and trade relationship is 0.037, about 40% of the
slope that Kose & Yi (2006) estimate in the data, which is 0.089. Thus, the model with
imperfect competition, through its e⁄ects on the measurement of real GDP, qualitatively
changes the way that measured TFP depends on trade in our model, and has the potential
to quantitatively change the relationship between trade intensity and GDP correlations. An
extension of this setup to a model with more than two countries, calibrated to match bilateral
trade shares, would be needed to provide a better quantitative evaluation of this mechanism￿ s
ability, combined with endogenous specialization, to solve the trade-comovement puzzle.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.
17With imperfect competition, the expressions we derived above for real GDP are no longer valid, and
analogous expressions are much more intractable. To compute aggregate statistics, we draw e¢ ciencies for
one hundred thousand goods, compute the relevant variables for producers of each good every period, and
calculate aggregates at base-period prices as sample averages.
32VIII. Conclusion
We have developed a model vertical specialization in international trade in a setting with
aggregate ￿ uctuations. We asked whether this framework can account for the trade comove-
ment puzzle identi￿ed by Kose & Yi (2001) and (2006). While the framework we develop
does not resolve the puzzle, our work helps to take important steps in understanding the rea-
sons behind its persistence under di⁄erent modeling frameworks: we prove that with perfect
competition, measured TFP does not depend on trade or vertical specialization intensity.
While vertical specialization as we have speci￿ed it provides an intuitive reason for countries
that trade more to be more correlated, additional mechanisms are needed to account for the
extent to which this channel a⁄ects the behavior of measured business cycle statistics. Our
preliminary results from a model with variable markups indicate that this feature, combined
with vertical specialization, is a promising avenue for further exploration to link trade and
TFP ￿ uctuations.









Canada 1971 :20 :77 :71 1990 :27 :70 :57
France 1972 :18 :81 :86 1990 :24 :70 :72
Germany 1978 :18 :79 :81 1990 :20 :75 :73
Japan 1970 :18 :90 :95 1990 :11 :89 :91
United Kingdom 1979 :25 :74 :75 1990 :26 :64 :62
United States 1972 :06 :94 :93 1990 :11 :88 :81
Table 1: Vertical Specialization Measures from Hummels et al. (2001) and domestic expen-
diture shares for intermediate and ￿nal goods from OECD Input-Output Tables
Benchmark (￿ = 1) Vert. Spec. (￿ = :5)
variable trade/GDP trade/GDP
3% 9% 15% 3% 9% 15%
corr(Y1;Y2) .01 .02 .04 .01 .01 .02
corr(A1;A2) .00 .00 .01 .01 .00 -.01
corr(L1;L2) .02 .05 .10 .02 .04 .07
corr(X 1;X 2) .02 .05 .10 .02 .04 .06
corr(C1;C2) .01 .03 .11 .01 .02 .03
corr(~ Y 1; ~ Y 2) .02 .06 .11 .02 .04 .07







(￿;:10) (￿;:30) (￿;:50) (:04;:04) (:11;:11) (:19;:19)
V S index (%) - - - .26 .79 1.32
Table 2: Model business cycle correlations (see text for variable de￿nitions).






corr(X 1;X 2) .08 .06
corr(C1;C2) .06 .04
corr(~ Y 1; ~ Y 2) .09 .07
corr( ~ A1; ~ A2) .09 .07
corr(Y1
1;Y2








V S index (%) 1.18 .83
Table 3: Model correlations for high and low vertical specialization cases (See text for variable
de￿nitions)






corr(X 1;X 2) .06 .07
corr(C1;C2) .05 .09
corr(~ Y 1; ~ Y 2) .07 .08





















V S1 index (%) .87 .10
V S2 index (%) 1.89 4.41
Table 4: Model correlations with asymmetric countries. Country 1 has comparative advan-
tage in ￿rst stage (See text for variable de￿nitions)
Benchmark (￿ = 1) Vert. Spec. (￿ = :5)
variable trade/GDP trade/GDP
3% 9% 15% 3% 9% 15%
corr(Y1;Y2) .01 .04 .06 .04 .06 .09
corr(A1;A2) .02 .04 .06 .04 .07 .10
corr(L1;L2) .01 .03 .06 .03 .05 .07
corr(X 1;X 2) .01 .03 .06 .03 .05 .07
corr(C1;C2) .02 .05 .08 .04 .06 .09
corr(~ Y 1; ~ Y 2) .01 .03 .07 .03 .05 .07
corr( ~ A1; ~ A2) .01 .03 .07 .03 .05 .07
Table 5: Model business cycle correlations, imperfect competition case (see text for variable
de￿nitions).
36A Appendix
Sketch of proof of Proposition 1. More details for the proofs are available in an
online appendix in the authors￿websites. The goal of this proof is to compute a ￿rst order
approximation of the relationship Yi
t = Zi
t ￿Ii
t . We make use of the approximation g (xt) ￿
g0 (x)x^ xt, where ^ xt = log(xt)￿log(x). Variables without a time subscript refer to the steady
state (base period) value. The approximation can be written as Yi ^ Yi
t = Zi ^ Zi




















































































The derivations are lengthy, but some intuition is provided in the text and the technical de-
tails are in an online appendix. By using the fact that in the steady state, Yi = Y i, along with
(wiLi
1 + riKi
1)=Y i = 1￿￿, (wiLi
2 + riKi
2 + P i
1Mi
T)=Y i = ￿, and (wiLi
N + riKi
N + P i
1Mi
N)=Y i =
1 ￿ ￿, we arrive at the conclusion that
^ Y
i
t = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
i
1t + ￿ ^ A
i
2t + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ A
i
Nt + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ L
i
t + ￿ ^ K
i
t .
The de￿nition of ^ Ai
t directly implies equation (32).
Sketch of proof of Proposition 2. The proof requires substituting equation (16) with
(17) and equation (20) into the expression for real income, (33), as well as using the fact
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40B Appendix
Model expressions for real GDP
Aggregate Gross Output
We use equation (29) and the fact that the value of gross output of each good evaluated at



































































Each set of the form ￿i
st consists of two parts: those goods that were produced by country
i in period 0, ￿i
st \ ￿i
s0, and those that were imported, ￿i
st \ ￿
ji
s0. Imposing this partition
























































































































st (!) = qi
st=zi
s (!) the zi
s (!) terms in ~ qi
s0 (!)=qi
st (!) cancel out for goods in all of
￿i
st, so that the input demands can be aggregated across sectors using the relationships in
























































































































Now, the sets ￿i
st \ ￿
ji





















so that, changing the variable of integration from ! to pairs of zi
s;zj
s, the two integral terms



































































































































18The di⁄erence between (A.1) and the expression for gross output under the alternative base-period price
rule is that the last two terms in (A.1) would be zero. As shown in the next subsection, these two terms are
zero to a ￿rst order approximation.
42Aggregate Expenditures on Intermediate Inputs
In equation (30), we need to split up the range of goods purchased by country i depending
on the pattern of specialization both in the current period, and in the base period. We need
to know from which country each good was bought in each period, to determine the base
period price and the current period quantity purchased. Let ￿
ji
1t denote the set of goods that
country i purchases from country j in period t. Then, for example, the set of goods which
country i buys from home in period t but imported in period 0 is ￿ii
1t \ ￿
ji



































































































































































































43Next, we use the fact that, for example, goods ! in ￿ii
1t\￿ii
10, are goods for which country


























































































By changing the variable of integration from ! to pairs of zi
1;z
j































































































































































































Given equilibrium prices and aggregate quantities, we compute the integral terms numeri-
cally.
44Proof of Proposition 1
Throughout, we make use of the approximation g (xt) ￿ g0 (x)x^ xt, where ^ xt = log(xt) ￿
log(x), and a variable without a time subscript refers to the steady state (base period) value.





































































































































































































































Nt + ￿1^ ￿
i
1t + ￿2^ ￿
i
2t ,




































































19￿1t and ￿2t equal zero in the steady state, and so log deviations of the form ￿s (log￿st ￿ log￿s)
are not technically well-de￿ned, but take the value zero when considered as the limit of
(￿s + ")(log(￿st + ") ￿ log(￿s + ")) as " ! 0.
















































where the term Ii
dd1t refers to the integral term in (A.5) over the set of goods that country
i purchases domestically in both periods 0 and t. (Hence the mnemonic dd in the subscript).
The approximation of Ii















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































mmt = 0 , (A.8)
where fi
1 is the pdf of the distribution F i
1. Now, the price index P i




































































































































































































since the steady state prices are the base period prices.















Nt + (1 ￿ ￿) ^ L
i



















2 + P i
1Mi
T)






N + P i
1Mi
N)
Y i = 1 ￿ ￿ .
















which proves the result.
48Proof of Proposition 2

























￿ ￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿1
Using the (17), ￿i
2t can be expressed in terms of input prices and ￿
ii
2t, the fraction of





























Now, again using (16) and (17), the stage-1 price index P i































Plugging (A.10), (A.11) and (20) into the expression for real income, and using the fact that


































































￿=￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ ￿
￿
￿
￿+1￿￿
￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿1
1￿￿ .
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